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CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF GRAND JURY
TESTIMONY: THE UNAVAILABLE
WITNESS, CONFRONTATION, AND DUE
PROCESS

The grand jury plays a critical role in the administration of criminal
justice in both federal and state systems. 1 It is used to investigate
suspected crimes and to determine whether sufficient evidence exists
to indict and proceed to trial. 2 In addition, testimony heard at grand
jury proceedings often provides valuable assistance to parties during
1. For federal felony prosecutions, indictment by grand jury is required by the fifth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Indictment may be waived for noncapital offenses and prosecution by information substituted. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a), (b). Indictment by grand jury is unusual
in that, unlike other guarantees in the Bill of Rights, it does not apply to state prosecutions
through the fourteenth amendment. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. S 16 (1884); accord Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). About twenty states still require felony indictments by grand jury
(and five more require it for capital offenses), while the rest allow charges to be brought by
information and use grand juries only occasionally, usually for investigative purposes rather than
for screening prosecutions. Y. KAMISAR. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL. MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
712-13, 1016 (5th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL PROCEDURE).
2. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 712.
Criticism of prosecution by indictment is largely responsible for the shift among states toward
prosecution by information. When the fifth amendment was ratified, all fifty states required
indictments in felony cases. Anti-indictment sentiment became strong in the early 1930's, but
the state trend toward prosecution by information has slackened. Debate on constitutional and
statutory reforms, however, continues. Id. at 1016. See generally M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS.
THE GRAND JURY (1977); Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, Sl
A.B.A.J. 153 (1965); Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury, 78 MICH. L. REv. 463 (1980);
Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174 (1973); Morris, Book
Review, 87 YALE L.J. 680 (1978).
The grand jury is characterized as both a "sword" and a "shield." United States v. Cox,
342 F.2d 167, 174-75 (5th Cir. 1965). In its earliest English form, jurors were subservient to
the king. They could accuse based on their own knowledge-as well as investigate charges brought
by outsiders. The evolution of the institution into a bulwark against government oppression was
dramatized five hundred years later, in 1681, when a grand jury refused to indict Lord Shaftesbury
for treason, despite pressure from Charles II. This protective function was imported to the New
World:
Historically, this body has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our
society of standing between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an individual, minority group, or other, to determine whether a charge is founded upon
reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will.
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). Today, many argue that the grand jury has ceased
to screen effectively and serves instead as a weapon of the prosecution. See infra notes 65-76
and accompanying text. See generally M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, supra, at 6-17, 99-102; R.
YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL 1-4 (1963); Arenella, supra, at 474.
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subsequent stages of litigation. 3 Defendants, for example, may wish
to review grand jury transcripts in order to challenge an indictment
or to help prepare a defense. 4 At the trial itself, if a grand jury witness
appears, both prosecution and defense can use the prior testimony as
substantive evidence, s for impeachment purposes, 6 or to refresh a
witness's memory. 7
On occasion, grand jury testimony is introduced at trial when the
grand jury witness is unavailable 8 to testify in person. In this situation, the grand jury transcript is particularly useful to the prosecution,
for it may represent the best evidence at its disposal. 9 Although the
absence of the witness renders the grand jury testimony hearsay, 10 some
courts have admitted it under an exception to the hearsay rule. 11 In
3. Both the existence and availability of transcripts varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Transcription of grand jury testimony is required in the federal system, FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e),
and in about thirty states. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N PRINCIPLES 12 (1977). Transcription is _fairly
common in other jurisdictions, at the prosecutor's discretion. While some jurisdictions allow
defendants access to the entire transcript following indictment, others disclose only the testimony
of witnesses who testify at trial, absent a special showing of need. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra
note I, at 1026 n.c., 1055. The grand jury transcript may figure prominently in collateral proceedings as well, particularly those involving the scope of a witness's immunity or perjury. Id. at 748.
4. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note I, at 1167.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 613 F.2d 629, 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
920 (1980); United States v. Morgan, 555 F.2d 238, 241-42 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Mosley, 555· F.2d 191, 193 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1978); United States v.
De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 933-34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 555 F.2d 238, 242 (9th Cir. 1977).
7. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233 (1940); Tolbert v. Jago, 607
F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1022 (1979).
8. "Unavailable" is a term of art and the precise definition varies according to a particular
jurisdiction's rules of evidence. FED. R. Evm. 804(a) provides that:
'Unavailability as a witness' includes situations in which the declarant - (I) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the
subject matter of his statement; or (2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement despite an order of the court to do so; or (3) testifies to
a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or (4) is unable to be present
or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness
or infirmity; or (5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has
been unable to procure his attendance . . . by process or other reasonable means. A
declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of lack of
memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or
testifying.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Barlow,
693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 57 (1982); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978); United States v. Carlson,
547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1976); United States v. Mastrangelo, 533
F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
10. "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. Evm.
S0l(c).
11. The relevant federal provision is FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(5):
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United States v. West, 12 for example, the Fourth Circuit approved the
admission of the grand jury testimony of a witness who had been slain
before the trial. The court held that the testimony was "essentially
trustworthy'' despite its hearsay status. 13
Defendants, however, have raised serious constitutional objections
to the introduction of grand jury testimony when the witness is unavailable to testify at trial. These claims have focused on the confrontation clause 14 of the sixth amendment and the due process clauses 15 of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Defendants have contended that
the introduction of testimony from a grand jury proceeding which cannot be subjected to cross-examination 16 fatally compromises the defendant's right to a fair trial. Lower courts are split over admitting grand
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness [is not excluded as hearsay] if
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice wilf best be served by admission
of the statement into evidence.
Courts disagree on the scope of this exception, some construing it to encompass the grand jury
testimony of unavailable witnesses and others holding to the contrary. Compare United States
v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982), and United States v.
Balano, 618 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980), (suggesting the rule
should be interpreted narrowly), with United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978),
United States v. Gamer, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978), and United
States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977) (grand jury
testimony can meet the rule's "trustworthiness" requirement). See also McKethan v. United States,
439 U.S. 936, 939 n.3 (1978) (Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (questioning whether FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(5) was intended to provide case-by-case exceptions rather
than categoric expansion of hearsay exceptions). Cf. S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7065-66 (suggesting that use of the
residual hearsay exception will be rare).
Although interpreting this hearsay exception and comparable state provisions is an important
issue, it is beyond the scope of this Note to determine whether grand jury testimony satisfies
the statutory requirements of a particular jurisdiction. Rules of evidence are subject to revision
within the limits imposed by the Constitution; it is those limits which this Note explores. See
the discussion of the relationship between hearsay and the confrontation clause irifra notes 20-28
and accompanying text.
12. 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978).
13. See supra note 11.
In a companion case, United States v. Gamer, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 936 (1978), the Fourth Circuit upheld a conviction for the importation of heroin, relying
in part on a co-conspirator's grand jury testimony. Although the co-conspirator was physically
present, see supra note 8, his refusal to answer questions prompted resort to the grand jury
transcript.
14. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him . . . . " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The protection is applicable
to the state prosecutions through the fourteenth amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
15. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . . " U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . . " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
16. See infra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
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jury testimony in these circumstances, 11 and the Supreme Court has
yet to rule on the issue. 18 As a result, trial judges are left with little
guidance as they grapple with evidentiary disputes amidst the pressures
of criminal prosecutions. This Note argues that the confrontation clause
normally bars grand jury testimony, but that it may be admissible when
a defendant has waived his confrontation rights and an independent
standard of due process is satisfied. Part I discusses the framework
for confrontation analysis established by the Supreme Court in the context of preliminary hearings 19 and applies it to the grand jury setting.
This section concludes that grand jury testimony does not meet the
Court's test for reliability and therefore should not, as a general matter,
be admissible at a later trial. Part II goes beyond the issue of confrontation and examines the additional considerations important for due process analysis if a defendant waives the right to confront.

17. The Fourth Circuit has approved the use of grand jury testimony on several occasions.
United States v. Murphy, 6% F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131
(4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936
(1978). The Second Circuit has held that grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness is not
admissible, although that decision predates adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence and was
apparently based on an interpretation of the hearsay rule as well as the confrontation clause.
United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973). Under
special circumstances, grand jury testimony has been admitted by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits. See United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982) (testimony met the
confrontation clause's "reliability" standard); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.)
(evidence was "clear and convincing" that the defendant had waived his confrontation right
and no due process violation existed), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982); Tolbert v. Jago,
607 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1979) (acknowledging that although a jury may have considered the substantive content of grand jury testimony in violation of instructions, admission was constitutional
due to special circumstances), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1022 (1980); United States v. Balano, 618
F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that a defendant's threats on a witness's life may constitute
a waiver of confrontation rights, justifying the admission of grand jury testimony), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 840 (1980); United States v. Marks, 585 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1978) (admitting a codefendant's prior grand jury testimony violated the defendant's confrontation right, which was
not implicitly waived by his failure to move for a severance); United States v. Gonzalez, 559
F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977) (no need to reach confrontation issue because introduction of grand
jury testimony violated the hearsay rule); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976)
(grand jury testimony held properly admitted after a hearing determining that threats by the
defendant were the likely cause of the witness's refusal to testify at trial), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
914 (1977).
18. McKethan v. United States, 439 U.S. 936 (1978) (Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (noting that the Courts of Appeals are split and that both the Federal
Rules of Evidence and the sixth amendment may place limits on the use of grand jury testimony);
see also Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014, 1019 (1978) (White & Blackmun,
JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (suggesting that McKethan was suitable for a grant
of certiorari).
19. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). These
preliminary hearing decisions are particularly helpful in exploring the issue of grand jury testimony
because the two types of proceedings often serve the same function - screening cases to determine whether to proceed with a prosecution. See infra notes 60-98 and accompanying texL
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THE CONFRONTATION REQUIREMENT

Ohio v. Roberts - Preliminary Hearing Testimony
and the Reliability Test

A literal reading of the sixth amendment's confrontation clause seems
to preclude the admission of all hearsay in criminal trials because a
defend ant cannot confront the declarant, 20 who is functioning as a
"witness[ ] against him .... " 21 The clause has not been interpreted
so broadly, however. 22 Historical analysis provides a persuasive basis
for rejecting this absolute approach. Although the rule against hearsay evidence predates ratification of the sixth amendment, several wellestablished exceptions to the general prohibition also existed at that
time. 23 The use of some kinds of indirect evidence was therefore tacitly
approved by the Framers, scholars and judges have concluded, reasoning
that any major departure from evidentiary standards would have been
expressed more explicitly. 24 Once an interpretation of the confrontation clause as a blanket restriction on all indirect evidence is rejected,
delimiting the scope of its protection is problematic. 25 The statutory
20. "A 'declarant' is a person who makes a statement." FED. R. Ev1D. 80l(b).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. But see Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 MICH. L.
REv. 1185, 1200-02, 1206-07 (1979) (the literal reading appears impossible only because "witnesses
against" has been incorrectly interpreted; it should be understood to include only witnesses who
are available to appear in court and whom the prosecution can reasonably expect the defendant
will wish to cross-examine immediately).
22. A literal reading of confrontation would "abrogate virtually every hearsay exception,
a result long rejected as unintended and too extreme." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
23. The rule against admitting hearsay crystallized in the late 1600's or early 1700's, though
its roots are much older. It was inspired by a desire to exclude unreliable evidence. See generally
Read, The New Confrontation-Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. l, 4-5 (1972); 5 J.
WIGMORE. EVIDENCE § 1364 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as WIGM0RE]; C.
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 244-45 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK]. Legal
historians disagree as to how many exceptions were part of the common law when the sixth
amendment was drafted. Compare WIGMORE § 1397 ("there was never a time when [the hearsay rule] was without exceptions" - though none are enumerated) with F. HELLER, THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT To THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 105 n.65 (1951) (only the dying
declaration exception was recognized at common law).
24. See, e.g., Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 547-48 (1926) ("The right of confrontation did not originate with the provision in the Sixth Amendment, but was a common-law
right having recognized exceptions. The purpose of that provision, this Court often has said,
is to continue and preserve that right, and not to broaden it or disturb the exceptions.") See
also Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911) (no confrontation violation when judge and
clerk certified the trial record to the appellate court without the accused's presence); Kirby v.
United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899) (dying declarations admissible); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165
U.S. 275 (1897) (deposition of dead witness admissible); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237
(1895) (testimony of deceased witness from former trial admissible); Mattox v. United States,
146 U.S. 140 (1892) (dying declarations admissible); Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation, 113 u. PA. L. REV. 741, 746-47 (1965).
25. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-65 (1980).
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and common law rules governing hearsay have changed since the sixth
amendment was adopted, 26 and it is now clear that the confrontation
guarantee is not synonomous with any particular formulation of evidentiary law. 21 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's analysis of the confrontation clause has been informed by the rationale underlying common
hearsay rules - excluding unreliable evidence. 28

Historically, the confrontation guarantee is linked with the need to prevent the government
from conducting trials by affidavit, thereby denying defendants a reasonable opportunity to defend themselves. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156-57 (1970). See also Read, supra
note 23, at 5-6; Note, supra note 24, at 742-43. The popularization of this concern is often
attributed to the abusive prosecution of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603. See, e.g., Green, 399 U.S.
at 157 n.10; Note, supra, at 746 n.31; Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay
Rule, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 99-100 (1972) (discussing the evidence used against Raleigh and
reproducing some of the testimony). See generally F. HELLER, supra note 23, at 104.
26. The most prominent example, at the federal level, was the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence in 1975. See also Read, supra note 23, at 11-15.
27. Although early cases tended to confuse or equate confrontation and hearsay, their independence is now well-established. Reluctance to equate confrontation and the hearsay rules
is in part inspired by the widespread belief that the rules of evidence are badly in need of reform
and that to constitutionalize them under the guise of "confrontation" would freeze a bad system
into place. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980). It is acknowledged, however,
that confrontation and hearsay "stem from the same roots," Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
86 (1970), and "protect similar values." California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
28. See infra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
True to the common-law tradition, the process has been gradual, building on past decisions, drawing on new experience, and responding to changing conditions. The Court
has not sought to "map out a theory of the Confrontation Clause that would determine
the validity of all ... hearsay 'exceptions.'" ... But a general approach to the problem is discernible.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1980) (citations omitted).
Early cases focused on cross-examination. In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the Court
held that use of testimony from a preliminary hearing where the defendant had not been represented
by counsel would violate the confrontation clause. It noted that the right to confront includes
the right to cross-examine, and that confrontation is applicable to the states through the four. teenth amendment's due process clause. The Court placed similar emphasis on cross-examination
as a vital component of confrontation in Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). There, the
prosecutor put an accomplice on the stand and read aloud his confession inculpating the defendant, purportedly to refresh the accomplice's memory. The defendant's rights had been violated,
the Court held, because the witness's memory lapse precluded cross-examination. Again in Barber
v. Page, 390 U.S: 719 (1968), the Court described confrontation as a trial right and noted that
a past opportunity to cross-examine a witness - i.e., at a preliminary hearing - would not
satisfy the constitutional requirement. That decision, however, turned on the fact that the prosecution had been lax in its efforts to secure the witness's presence at trial; thus, the crossexamination language is essentially dictum.
The Court began to back away from the absolute stance of Pointer in California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149 (1970), in which it allowed the admission of cross-examined preliminary hearing
testimony when the witness professed a memory lapse at trial. A year later, in Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74 (1970), hearsay was permitted where there had been no prior opportunity for crossexamination. In Dutton a witness recounted the statement of the defendant's co-conspirator,
a former cell-mate. The Court denied a writ for habeas corpus, noting that the defendant had
been able to cross-examine twenty prosecution witnesses, although not the co-conspirator. The
Court concluded that error, "if ... [it] exists, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'' Id. at 93.
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In Ohio v. Roberts, 29 the Supreme Court's most recent exploration
of the parameters of confrontation, the defendant challenged the state's
use of preliminary hearing testimony that had been properly admitted
under the Ohio rules of evidence governing unavailable witnesses. 30
Herschel Roberts had been convicted for receiving stolen property. His
defense - that he was given the checks and credit cards by their owners'
daughter with the understanding that he could use them - was rebutted
by the prosecution's introduction of the daughter's testimony from the
preliminary hearing. 31 Roberts's appointed counsel had called the
daughter as his only witness at the hearing and questioned her "at
some length. " 32 Although she testified that she knew Roberts and had
let him stay at her apartment while she was away, she denied having
given him the checks and cards or permission to use them. By the time
of trial, the daughter could not be located. The preliminary hearing
transcript was admitted over the objections of Roberts's counsel. 33
In assessing Roberts's claim, the Court acknowledged that confrontation is an ill-defined concept. 34 It considered both the policies underlying
the confrontation clause and competing societal interests. 35 On the one
hand, the confrontation clause "reflects a preference for face-to-face
confrontation at trial" and facilitates cross-examination. 36 Allowing
the fact-finder to observe the demeanor of the witness, thereby assessing credibility, promotes accuracy. 37 The Court also recognized,
however, that "every jurisdiction has a strong interest in effective law
enforcement, and in the development and precise formulation of the
rules of evidence ... in criminal proceedings. " 38 These latter interests,
on occasion, "may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial. " 39
The Court reconciled these competing concerns with a two-step approach. As a threshold requirement, the Court held that the confrontation clause imposes a "rule of necessity": the prosecution must
produce its witnesses or demonstrate their unavailability. 40 This initial
29. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
30. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.49 (Page 1975). Roberts, 448 U.S. at 59.
31. The preliminary hearing was followed by a county grand jury indictment for forgery,
receiving stolen property, and possession of heroin. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 59-60.
34. Id. at 62-65.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 63.
37. Id. at 63-64.
38. Id. at 64.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 65. A qualification of this "rule" diminishes its significance. A !lemonstration
of unavailability is not required where "the utility of trial confrontation [is] so remote" that
a court finds it pointless to "require the prosecution to produce a seemingly available witness."
Id. at 65 n.7.
There are two possible explanations for this exception to the Roberts test. First, it may be
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requirement operates as a safeguard against the possibility of an abusive
"trial by affidavit. " 41 Once a witness is deemed "unavailable," the
Court's second element comes into play. To be admissible, a statement made by an unavailable witness must bear "adequate 'indicia
of reliability.' " 42 Traditional hearsay rules are the touchstone for this
reliability inquiry. When challenged evidence falls within a "firmly
rooted" hearsay exception, reliability is simply inferred. 43 Other types
of evidence, however, must evince "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"44 or be excluded. 45
Applying this test to the facts of Roberts, the Court held that the
daughter's preliminary hearing testimony was admissible. The threshold
requirement of the witness's unavailability at trial was satisfied by the
prosecution's good faith efforts. 46 The Court therefore concentrated
on the reliability of the testimony, focusing on the characteristics of
the hearing. 47 The crucial factor in its finding that adequate "indicia
of reliability" existed was vigorous questioning by the defense attorney.

understood as an effort to reconcile Roberts with the holding in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74 (1970), where there was no discussion of why the declarant did not appear in person even
though, as a prisoner, he was presumably "available" to the prosecution. The defendant in that
case was clearly unwilling to concede the uselessness of trial confrontation. See also United States
v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 1981) ("necessity" is not an absolute requirement under
Roberts).
Second, a number of writers have expressed concern that an iron-clad rule of necessity would
call into question well-established and non-controversial hearsay exceptions and needlessly overburden courts with unwieldly evidence. Compare California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 172-89 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring), and Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434,
1439 (1966) (confrontation requires only a good faith effort by the prosecution to produce all
witnesses at trial), with Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 93-100 (Harlan, J., concurring) (repudiating
his position in Green because requiring the production of available witnesses would curtail the
development of the law of evidence). See also Westen, supra note 21 (confrontation requires
the production of only those available witnesses whom the prosecution can reasonably expect
the defendant will wish to cross-examine immediately); Read, supra note 23, (advocating a caseby-case examination of hearsay exceptions for compliance with the underlying values of confrontation); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 194-96, (1971) (cases seem to
focus on prosecution's conduct and not the nature of hearsay) [hereinafter cited as The Supreme
Court].
Although a loose interpretation of this qualification to the "necessity" prong of the Roberts
test threatens to render the confrontation guarantee meaningless, if conscientiously circumscribed
it provides a reasonable accommodation by permitting the use of well-established and noncontroversial hearsay exceptions. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 803(6), (8) (business records, public
reports).
Disagreement over whether the state had met its burden of proof on "necessity" prompted
the dissent in Roberts. 448 U.S. at 77-82.
41. See supra note 25.
42. Id. at 66 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)).
43. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
44. But see infra note 117.
45. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
46. Id. at 74-77. But see supra note 40.
47. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 67-73.
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While the daughter technically testified on direct examination, 48 the
Court emphasized that the exchange amounted to "the equivalent of
significant cross-examination. " 49 Counsel repeatedly used leading questions, formally the distinguishing characteristic of cross-examination. so
More importantly, the Court found that the purpose of the questioning was identical to that behind cross-examination. s I Defense counsel
probed the witness's sincerity, perception, memory, and ability to
communicate. 52 Relying on the "guarantees of trustworthiness in the
accouterments [sic] of the preliminary hearing itself," the Court held
that the daughter's testimony satisfied the confrontation clause, 53 refusing to distinguish Roberts from an earlier case 54 involving cross-examined
preliminary hearing testimony.

B.

Roberts Reliability Test and Grand Jury Testimony

In Roberts the Supreme Court addressed the effect of the confrontation guarantee on the use of preliminary hearing testimony. Its twostep analysis applies more generally, ss however, and provides the
framework for evaluating the use of grand jury testimony as well. 56
48. After the prosecution had called several witnesses, Roberts's lawyer called the complainant's daughter, whom he had seen in the courthouse hallway. He questioned her at length and
attempted to elicit an admission that she had led the defendant to believe she had permission
to use her parents' checks and credit cards. She denied the suggestion, and the attorney never
asked to have her declared hostile or placed on cross-examination. The prosecutor did not examine the witness. Technically, therefore, the defense questioning took place on direct examination. Yet' as a matter of form and purpose, it resembled cross-examination; neither the prosecutor nor the judge protested and the scope of the exchange was not limited. Id. at 58, 70-71.
49. Id. at 70.
50. Id. at 70-71. See FED. R. Evm. 611(c) ("Leading questions should not be used on direct
examination . . . [but] should be permitted on cross-examination.").
51. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 71. The Court apparently failed to consider that the purposes of
a preliminary hearing and a trial differ in that the former is concerned with probable cause
and the latter with guilt or innocence. The extent and scope of defense cross-examination at
the hearing stage is, therefore, not likely to be the same as at trial, regardless of formal limitations. Defense questioning at a hearing can be affected by the defendant's interests both in exploring the strength of the prosecution's case and protecting the details of its own. Lack of
preparation (especially when, as in Roberts, the defendant's counsel is appointed) and the understandable expectation of another opportunity to cross-examine the witness at trial - despite local
rules about the admissibility of prior testimony - may also restrict cross-examination at a
preliminary hearing.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 73.
54. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
55. See, e.g., Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1982) (unsworn statement to police);
Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1981) (extrajudicial statements of murder victim and
her mother); Black v. Woods, 651 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1981) (accomplice's unsworn statements
to police and prior trial testimony); United States v. Fielding, 630 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1980)
(extrajudicial declaration of alleged co-conspirator).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mur-
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Once a grand jury witness is deemed ''unavailable,'' the reliability inquiry determines whether admission of the grand jury transcript is
constitutional. 57 Because grand jury testimony does not fall within a
well-established exception to the hearsay rule 58 - which would trigger
an inference of reliability under Roberts - it must be scrutinized to
determine whether it possesses adequate ''indicia of reliability.'' 59
Although the minimum threshold of reliability for confrontation purposes is an open question, the Supreme Court has determined that the
characteristics of preliminary hearings are sufficient guarantees. 60
Therefore, a comparison of the "accoutrements" of the grand jury
setting and preliminary hearings provides insight into the reliability of
grand jury transcripts for later use at trial.
1. Similarities- Grand jury testimony does share certain attributes
with preliminary hearing testimony that contribute to reliability. 61 Like
phy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 57 (1982); United States v. Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
57. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
58. For example, grand jury testimony does not qualify under the federal rules as a "former
testimony" exception to the hearsay rule.
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding,
or in a deposition . . . [is not excluded as hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as
a witness] if the party against whom the testimony is now offered ... had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
FED. R. Evrn. 804(b)(l) (emphasis added). FED. R. Evrn. 804(b)(5), the residual exception, is
"of recent origin." United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, n.8 (6th Cir. 1982).
59. 448 U.S. at 66.
60. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). The Roberts Court,
however, specifically reserved the question whether testimony from a preliminary hearing
characterized by little or no defense questioning would violate the confrontation clause. Roberts,
448 U.S. at 70.
61. Reflecting this fact, grand jury testimony is admissible as substantive evidence of guilt
- not merely as a means of refreshing memory or impeachment - when the witness is present
at trial and subject to cross-examination. See FED. R. Evrn. 80l(d)(l), providing, inter alia, that
[a] statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and
is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (8) consistent with
his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive. . . . (Emphasis added).
See also United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Woods,
613 F.2d 629, 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 920 (1980); United States v. Mosley, 555
F.2d 191, 193 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1978); United States v. Morgan, 555
F.2d 238, 241-42 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 983 (1976); United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929, 932-34 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964). Cf. United States v. Payne, 492 F.2d 449, 451-52 (4th Cir.)
("an oath or possible cross-examination provide [sic] sufficient assurances of reliability that the
statement ought to be admitted as substantive evidence of the facts it contains."), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 876 (1974); United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971) (grand jury testimony
held inadmissible under both hearsay rules and confrontation clause when the declarant, although
physically present, refused to be sworn and so was not subject to cross-examination), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 984 (1973).
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preliminary hearing testimony, grand jury testimony is elicited under
oath in surroundings likely to impress the witness with the solemnity
of the proceedings, and the sanction of perjury looms for false statements. 62 In both proceedings, the witness's account is given at a point
which is closer in time to the events described than is the trial, minimizing the chances of forgetfulness or embellishment. 63 In addition, the
contemporaneous creation of a verbatim transcript in each setting contributes to reliability because it ensures that the record of the proceedings
will be accurate and complete. 64
2. Differences- Despite these similarities, significant differences
between preliminary hearings and grand jury proceedings exist which
compromise the reliability of grand jury testimony for use at a later
trial when the witness is unavailable.
a. The absence of defense counsel- Preliminary hearings are like
trials in that the defendant, counsel, and judge are all present. 65 Grand
juries, on the other hand, are not traditional adversary proceedings:
they are one-man shows orchestrated by the prosecutor, with defense
counsel generally restricted to the anteroom. 66 This difference affects
the reliability of the resulting testimony in several ways. First, the prosecutor calls and examines all grand jury witnesses, 67 without opposing counsel to monitor the questioning and to object when appropriate.
The· lack of this usual adversarial balance creates the potential for

62. See, e.g., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
63. Cf United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981) (grand jury testimony properly
admitted under judge's discretion pursuant to FED. R. Evm. 80l(d)(l) where there was a year
and a half delay before trial). But see R. LEMPERT & s. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH To
EVIDENCE 474 n.66 (2d ed. 1982) ("Studies indicate that most forgetting occurs within a few
days after an event. Thus an individual who testifies at a hearing three months after an event
is likely to remember very little more about the event than an individual who testifies a year later.").
64. In 1979, FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) was amended to require that all grand jury proceedings,
except the jurors' deliberation and voting, be recorded. Many states transcnbe grand jury testimony
as well. See supra note 3.
65. The defendant's right to be present at trial is considered a component of the confrontation right. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS. supra note 2, at 30; Read, supra note 23,
at 49; Westen, Confrontation & Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567
(1978). The right may be forfeited, however, and a defendant excluded from the courtroom,
for continued "disruptive behavior" after a warning. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
66. Generally, the only parties in the grand jury room are the jurors, the prosecutor, the
witness, and a stenographer. The federal rules do not allow witnesses to have counsel present,
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d), though about a dozen states permit putative defendants to bring their
lawyers into the chamber. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS. supra note 2, at 24, 59-69. Witnesses
are permitted to interrupt their testimony to confer with counsel. Id. at 62-69. Even the few
jurisdictions which permit putative defendants to have counsel within the grand jury room restrict
their role to advising the witness, not questioning. See generally CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. supra
note l, at 782. Future defendants cannot always be identified at the grand jury stage, however,
and they have no right, in any case, to attend grand jury proceedings. See infra notes 77-81
and accompanying text (grand jury secrecy).
67. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, supra note 2, at 30.
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abuse. 68 As a trained advocate, the prosecutor may intimidate witnesses
or ask misleading questions. 69
Second, and more important, the absence of defense counsel precludes
the opportunity for cross-examination of grand jury witnesses. Although
cross-examination is not an absolute constitutional requirement under
the confrontation clause, 70 it is the primary mechanism for ensuring
"substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation
requirement." 11 Cross-examination promotes reliability by providing
an opportunity to test the accuracy of direct testimony 12 and by rendering the testimony more complete. 73 Because the grand jury setting, unlike
68. This "inquisitorial" procedure represents a relatively rare exception to the adversary method
that is fundamental to the American judicial system.
Inquisitorial systems view the criminal process as an official inquiry where state officials take primary responsibility for determining whether the defendant has committed a crime ... [S]tate officials direct the official investigation, determine the appropriate
charges, and conduct the course of a nonadversarial trial that offers a public recapitulation of the official investigation.
In contrast:
[o]ur accusatorial system structures criminal proceedings not as an official inquiry but
as a dispute between two parties, the state and the accused ... [l]t encompasses not
only adversarial trial procedure but other fundamental norms taken from constitutional
law that regulate the balance of advantage between the state and the accused throughout
the criminal process.
Arenella, supra note 2, at 465 nn.4-5.
Ex parte proceedings are used in some other contexts. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547 (1978) (search warrant for newspaper offices); Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S.
307 (1967) (injunction prohibiting a demonstration).
69. The pro-government bias is inherent in grand jury proceedings, despite the "presumption
of fair and orderly conduct by . . . state officials." In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 334 (1957).
American Bar Association standards require that the prosecutor, as legal advisor to the grand
jury, "give due deference to its status as an independent lega~ body" and "not make statements
or arguments in an effort to influence grand jury action in a manner which would be impermissible at trial before a petit jury." PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-3.5 (1978). Yet even
if the prosecutor complies with these standards, the grand jury receives a skewed perception
of the evidence because the prosecutor's goal is to establish probable cause or a prima facie
case, not to convey the full story. See infra note 75.
70. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (direct examination may serve as the
equivalent of cross-examination); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (use of absent coconspirator's statement does not violate the confrontation clause). See also Baker, The Right
to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rule, and Due Process - A Proposal for Determining When
Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529 (1974) (no absolute right to
cross-examination if policies are otherwise protected).
71. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166. See also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
295 (1973); W1GMORE, supra note 23, § 1367 ("[C]ross-examination is beyond any doubt the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.").
72. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64.
73. It is impossible to assess the utility of cross-examination that never occurred. United
States v. Murphy provides an interesting illustration. The witness's grand jury testimony was
admitted in two separate trials of the same defendants for different bank robberies. At the first
trial, the witness also testified in person, on cross-examination, that he had named the defen- ·
dants only after suggestions by an FBI agent; his refusal to be sworn at the second trial kept
that information from the jury. 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982). Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 709 (1974):
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a preliminary hearing, excludes precisely those parties - the defendant and his lawyer - who would be most motivated to probe the
weaknesses of a witness's account, point out gaps, and seize on facts
that fail to support the government's charges, 74 testimony elicited before
the grand jury may be neither accurate nor complete. 75 When a witness
is unavailable to testify at trial, the defendant is denied the opportunity to "cure" this deprivation of contemporaneous cross-examination. 76
As a result, the reliability of grand jury testimony is fatally compromised
for confrontation purposes.
b. Secrecy- Preliminary hearings are held in open court. 77 This
exposure to public view makes witnesses accountable for their statements, thereby encouraging true and complete testimony. 78 Grand jury
proceedings, on the other hand, are closed to everyone except the prosecutor, jurors, the witness, and a stenographer. 79 This system's secrecy
provides little incentive for rigorous and complete truth-telling, for it
conveys the impression to witnesses that they will be able to avoid
unpleasant grilling by defense counsel and that their testimony will never

The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and
comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgment were to
be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of
the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of
all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence.
74. This exclusion is arguably justified at the grand jury, where the issue is whether there
is enough evidence to go to trial; its importation into the trial itself, where the issue is guilt
or innocence, raises a more serious challenge to the adversary model. See supra note 68. In
some jurisdictions, prosecutors are under a duty to present exculpatory evidence. M. FRANKEL
& G. NAFTALIS, supra note 2, at 30-31, 70-72.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 628 (10th Cir. 1979) (usefulness of
cross-examination for clarifying damaging yet ambiguous grand jury testimony), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 840 (1980).
Indirect support for the proposition that the absence of defense counsel substantively affects
grand jury evidence can be found in statistics: grand juries refuse to issue indictments in only
about three to eight per cent of the cases presented to them. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note
I, at 22. See also Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, lO OR. L. REV. 101 (1931). But
see Dession, From Indictment to Information - Implications of the Shift, 42 YALE L.J. 163,
178-79 (1932) (the grand jury's high rate of concurrence with the prosecutor demonstrates excellent pre-screening). A third possibility is that the burden of showing probable cause or a prima
facie case, as opposed to guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, is so low that the rate of indictment
is naturally high.
76. See supra note 61.
77. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1. But see Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979)
(despite a "strong societal interest in public trials," the sixth amendment does not bar closure
of a pretrial proceeding to protect defendants' rights to a fair trial where the accused, the prosecutor, and the judge agree). Cf. Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430,
399 N.E.2d 518 (1979) (distinguishing various types of pretrial proceedings for closure purposes).
78. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (historical distrust of secret proceedings). Compare
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (general rule of secrecy for federal grand juries) with FED. R. CRIM.
P. 26 (general rule that trial testimony shall be taken orally in open court).
79. See supra note 66.
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be revealed to anyone outside the government. 80 The reliability of grand
jury testimony suffers as a result of this enhanced opportunity for exaggerations and omissions. 81 These defects may be as damning to the
defendant as outright lies, yet harder to detect and to rebut with a cold
record.
c. Evidentiary standards- Differences in evidentiary standards at
preliminary hearings and before grand juries also render testimony from
the latter proceeding suspect for use at trial. First, while preliminary
hearings usually follow tric!,l rules on the admissibility of evidence, 82
grand jury indictments may be based entirely on hearsay. 83 As a result,
a grand jury transcript used at trial could be double hearsay and its
80. See supra note 3. Under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(3) (1970), and FED. R.
CRIM. P. 26.2, federal defendants cannot discover the grand jury testimony of a prosecution
witness for possible use in impeaching the witness until the time of trial. When a witness will
not be available at trial, however, FED. R. Evrn. 804(b)(5) requires pretrial disclosure as a precondition for government use of the testimony:
[A] statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide
the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer
the statement and the particulars of it . . .
But see United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d I 141 (4th Cir.) (allowing use of grand jury testimony
at trial without prior notice when the witness's refusal to testify was unexpected), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 936 (1978).
State procedures on disclosure vary; many formerly required a stringent showing for discovery,
but most provisions today treat grand jury testimony like other recorded statements given by
a witness. See generally CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at ll67.
81. The Supreme Court has articulated five reasons for the grand jury secrecy rule:
(!) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to
insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons
subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent
subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before grand
jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and
untrammeled disclosure by persons who have information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect the innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure
of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing
trial where there was no probability of guilt.
United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6 (1958) (quoting United States
v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954)). See also M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, supra note
2, at 23 ("Secrecy is a dark notion with Americans . . . [b]ut the secrecy of the grand jury
is basically a good idea, as abused and perverted as it often is.").
82. See Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978)
(procedural advantages for defendants at hearings contrasted with grand juries). But see FED.
R. CRIM. P. 5.l(a) (finding of probable cause at the preliminary examination may be based entirely on hearsay).
83. The rules applicable to grand juries vary among jurisdictions. See, e.g., Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (federal indictment based entirely on hearsay). Cf United States
v. Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 1260 (3d Cir. 1979) (indictment to be dismissed if 1) non-hearsay
evidence was readily available, 2) the jurors were misled to believe they were hearing testimony
from personal knowledge, and 3) there is a high probability the jurors would not have voted
for indictment had they heard the eyewitness); United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir.
1972) (indictment dismissed based on government's needless use of hearsay); United States v.
Arcuri, 405 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1968) (unjustified use of hearsay before grand jury disapproved).
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reliability consequently diminished. 84 In addition, prosecutors may ask
leading questions before a grand jury, a technique which helps to. mold
a witness's answers along lines desired by the questioner. 85 The resulting
testimony will inevitably bear the traces of this pro-government bias,
more or less overtly, and its reliability for trial use is dubious.
The similarities between grand jury proceedings and preliminary hearings - oath requirements, formal surroundings, and the contemporaneous creation of a verbatim transcript - encourage reliable testimony,
but they constitute only meager guarantees, especially when witnesses
have personal interests at stake. 86 The factor most critical to safeguard
reliability is the opportunity for cross-examination. Oath requirements
may deter a witness from being less than candid on the stand, but
only the presence of defense counsel and the opportunity for crossexamination can ensure that questionable testimony will be examined
and exposed. 87 Prosecutors cannot be expected to perform zealously
the defense counsel's function. 88 When a defense lawyer elects not to
pursue cross-examination at a preliminary hearing or a trial for tactical reasons, a professional strategy judgment has been made based
on the total circumstances surrounding a case: either the testimony does
not appear very damaging, or there are other ways to attack it, or
the potential for harm exceeds the likelihood of eliciting useful
information. 89 But in the grand jury setting, where all opportunity for

84. See generally McCORMICK, supra note 23, § 310; R. LEMPERT & s. SALTZBURG, supra
note 63, at 370.
If a witness's statements before the grand jury are hearsay and the transcript of that proceeding is admitted at trial, the trier of fact is twice removed from the declarant and ill-equipped
to judge credibility. Double hearsay is admissible only when each level satisfies some exception
to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., FED. R. Evrn. 805.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271, 1273 (5th Cir. 1977) (leading questions can distort testimony). See also McKethan v. United States, 439 U.S. 936 (1978) (Stewart
& Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Cf. FED. R. Evm. 6ll(c) advisory committee note ("The rule continues the traditional view that the suggestive powers of the leading
question are as a general proposition undesirable.").
86. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
57 (1982); United States v. Gonzalez, 559 U.S. 1271, 1273 (5th Cir. 1977). See also United States
v. McKethan, 439 U.S. 936 (1978) (Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
87. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text. See also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1964) (admitting prior testimony at trial held to violate the confrontation clause when the lack
of appointed counsel at the preliminary hearing precluded effective cross-examination).
88. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
89. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 1371.
Inferring this rational weighing of the utility of cross-examination at a preliminary hearing
seems somewhat unrealistic, however, even if defense counsel is charged with the knowledge
that the testimony may be admissible at a later trial. Given time pressures, counsel is likely to
be less well prepared at the preliminary hearing stage and so less able to cross-examine meaningfully. Even if counsel is adequately prepared, discovery and plea-bargaining concerns may
influence the choice whether to cross-examine or not at a pretrial hearing. See infra note 98.
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cross-examination is denied, no similar inference of a calculated choice
by the defense mitigates the testimony's possible unreliability. 90
The secrecy 91 of grand jury proceedings and the added flexibility
of evidentiary rules 92 might not, by themselves, fatally compromise the
reliability of grand jury testimony if the opportunity existed for contemporaneous cross-examination. Although secrecy and flexible rules
increase the possibility of unreliable testimony, 93 the effectiveness of
cross-examination as a tool for highlighting inaccuracy and incompleteness would offset these other defects. 94
Thus, the overriding importance of the opportunity for crossexamination as a guarantor of reliable testimony outweighs the few
"indicia of reliability" that grand jury and preliminary hearing proceedings share. 95 Although the Roberts Court adopted a flexible and
pragmatic approach for assessing reliability, 96 vigorous defense counsel
participation at the preliminary hearing was the key to its decision. 97
Such participation is impossible before the grand jury, and when a
grand jury witness is subsequently unavailable at trial, defense counsel
cannot supplement the deficient record with live testimony. The admission of such evidence cannot be justified under the Roberts confrontation test. 98

90. The line drawn by courts has been whether there was an opportunity for cross-examination,
not whether cross-examination was full and effective rather than de minimus. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Haywood v. Wolff, 658 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Zurosky, 614
F.2d 779, 793 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 967 (1980); United States v. Amaya, 533
F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101 (1977). Cf. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 70, 73 n.12 (1980) (reserving the question whether de minimus questioning is sufficient to
satisfy confrontation and rejecting an "effectiveness" inquiry except in unusual circumstances);
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1972) (exploring the adequacy of cross-examination).
Relying on the opportunity for cross-examination and not the effective exercise of that right
accords with judicial reluctance to examine the competence of counsel. See Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, ll7-18 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, defendants are generally bound
by their lawyers' choices, even if they subsequently change attorneys. See, e.g., Roberts, 448
U.S. at 72; Morrow v. Wyrick, 646 F.2d 1229, 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 899
(1981); Amaya, 553 F.2d at 191-92.
91. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 71.
95. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1964)
(preliminary hearing testimony held inadmissible when absence of counsel precluded effective
cross-examination).
96. See supra notes 34-54 and accompanying text.
97. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70-73.
98. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. The striking difference in the degree of
defense counsel participation at preliminary hearings and grand juries is difficult to justify in
functional terms, because both proceedings serve to screen prosecutions. They are clearly not
perfect equivalents - for example, grand juries are important investigative tools and preliminary
hearings facilitate discovery - yet their functional similarity is substantial. See also supra note 89.
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BEYOND ROBERTS

The Roberts confrontation analysis cannot always determine the admissibility of grand jury testimony when a witness is unavailable at
trial. In United States v. Thevis, 99 for example, the court found that
the defendant had waived his confrontation rights by murdering a grand
jury witness in order to prevent his testimony at trial. The deceased
man's testimony was therefore admitted. 100 Similarly, the defendant's
waiver mooted confrontation analysis in United States v. Balano, 101
where the grand jury witness was frightened into silence by threats and
phone calls. A finding that confrontation has been waived, 102 however,

99. 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3489 (1982).
100. Id. at 630-31.
101. 618 F.2d 624, 628-30 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980).
102. The frequency with which defendants are found to have waived confrontation rights
suggests some judicial impatience with the exclusion of relatively reliable grand jury testimony.
Although it is clear that constitutional rights may be waived, Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. I
(1966), an "intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege" is required, Johnson·-v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). This standard encompasses implied as well as explicit waivers, but
there is always a presumption against waiver. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). Settings in which confrontation waiver has been found
effective include guilty pleas, see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); FED. R. CRIM.
P. ll(c)(3) & (4), and repeated disruptive behavior by the defendant, Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337 (1970).
Confrontation waivers as prerequisites for the admission of grand jury testimony of unavailable
witnesses have all been implied, based on evidence (or suspicion) that the defendant was responsible for the unavailability. Defendants have been deemed to "waive" the right either when they
have intimidated a witness who has become too fearful to testify, United States v. Carlson, 547
F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977), or when they have caused the witness's
death, United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982).
The waiver determination is usually made at an evidentiary hearing and the standard of proof
varies. Compare Thevis, 665 F.2d at 630-31 ("clear and convincing"), with United States v.
Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979) ("preponderance of the evidence"), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 840 (1980). The underlying premise of these cases is the equitable principle that a
wrongdoer should not profit from his misdeeds. See Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900);
F. HELLER, supra note 23, at 105-06.
Even where holdings have not turned on a finding of confrontation waiver, discussion of the
defendant's responsibility for a witness's unavailability often arises and seems to influence outcomes. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982) ("strong indication"
but no proof of defendants' pressure; testimony admitted); Tolbert v. Jago, 607 F.2d 753 (6th
Cir.) (grand jury testimony held admissible where the shooting of a key prosecution witness strongly
suggested his purported loss of memory at trial was due to threats), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1022
(1979); United States v. West, 574 F.2d I 131 (4th Cir. 1978) (deceased witness's grand jury testimony
held admissible in a drug prosecution where circumstances suggested a "contract" killing and
the testimony was corroborated); United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.) (grand jury
testimony found admissible because of substantial guarantees of trustworthiness; reliance on threats
to find waiver would be "speculative"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978); United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977) (grand jury testimony found inadmissible where there was
no claim by the unavailable witness that the defendant threatened him); United States v.
Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (no need to prove waiver by clear and convincing evidence where the government adequately demonstrated its particularized guarantees of
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does not automatically mean that grand jury testimony is admissible.
The due process clause 103 imposes an independent check on the use
of all evidence at a criminal trial, 1 04 including grand jury testimony.
This section focuses on what the nature and extent of this due process
scrutiny should be.
Fairness is the fundamental concern of the due process clause. 105
Those accused of a crime are assured a reasonable opportunity to defend
themselves. 106 In the context of evidentiary rules, for example, due process bars the use of evidence which is so unreliable that it fails to "afford
the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating its truth." 107 Due
process also requires that convictions be based only on evidence that,
in the aggregate, establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 108
Although the Supreme Court has never applied a due process analysis
to the problems posed by grand jury testimony when the witness is
unavailable, 109 it has held that the appropriate approach to due process analysis in analogous areas requires an examination of the "totality
of the circumstances." 110
trustworthiness). Cf. Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1200-04 (6th Cir. 1982) (unavailable coconspirator's prior unsworn statement properly admitted where the defendants caused the
unavailability through threats; court "must consider how far the standard of reliability and trustworthiness should be relaxed when the defendants are at fault"); United States v. Peacock, 654
F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981) (declarations of dead co-conspirators and murder victim admissible
under the "lenient" Roberts standard). See generally Graham, supra note 25, at 140-43.
103. See supra note I 5.
104. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 186 n.20 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also
Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (1971);
Westen, supra note 21; Note, supra note 40.
105. "[I]nflexible rules of exclusion [of evidence] that may frustrate rather than promote
justice have not been viewed recently by this Court with unlimited enthusiasm . . . . The standard, after all, is that of fairness as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 (1977) (citations omitted) (suspect identification
held admissible).
106. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1973) ("The right of an accused in a
criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against
the State's accusations . . . . ")
107. Mason v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
163-64 n.15 (1970); Westen, supra note 65, at 598.
108. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) ("In the administration of criminal justice,
courts must carefully guard against the dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established
by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.") (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
109. See supra notes 17 & 18 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Mason v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972);
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (suspect
identification cases). See also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1976) ("totality" approach to claim that jury trial in prison clothes violated due process); Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 303 (1973) (evidentiary rulings deprived the defendant of a fair trial based on
the "facts and circumstances" of this case); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690-91 (1972) (dictum) (pretrial police investigations are subject to due process scrutiny of "particularized circumstances"); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740-42 (1966) (voluntariness of pre-Miranda
confession assessed in light of the entire record).
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By its very nature, the "totality of the circumstances" approach cannot be reduced to a neat formula yielding predictable results. A court's
determination on admissibility must be informed by "reason, principle, and common human experience." 111 A careful examination of the
reliability of evidence is necessary even when the defendant is held to
have waived his constitutional right under the confrontation clause.
For although the defendant's decision to intimidate or even murder
the witness suggests that the defendant believed the witness's trial
testimony would have been damning and difficult to refute - and
therefore is a factor to be considered - the act of waiver is not
dispositive of the reliability of the unavailable witness's testimony.
Waiver bears no logical relationship to the accuracy and completeness
of the testimony elicited before the grand jury. 112 The defendant's right
to a fair trial under the due process clause, as well as society's institutional concern with fair and accurate criminal adjudications, 113 requires
a detailed inquiry into the probative value of the proffered grand jury
testimony . 114 The court's task is not to render a definitive pronouncement on the reliability of the grand jury testimony, but rather to determine whether it bears sufficient "indicia of reliability" for consideration
by a properly instructed jury. 115 Thus the threshold for admissibility
is comparatively low. 116
The scope of the due process inquiry into reliability is significantly
broader than the Roberts confrontation analysis. 111 For confrontation
Ill. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1976).
112. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 186 n.20 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); United
States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 633 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982). See also infra
note 114.
113. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("[T]he two-fold aim [of criminal justice]
is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.").
114. See supra note 110. See also Baker, supra note 70, at 549-55; Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1378, 1390 (1972); Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful
Witness, 56 TEX. L. REV. 151, 195-98 (1978).
115. "We are content to rely upon the good sense and judgment of American juries, for
evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are
not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony
that has some questionable feature." Mason v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977). The Court
has concluded that, within limits, jury instructions are a dependable safeguard. But see infra
note 137.
116. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) (exclusion required only if there
is a "very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification"); United States v. Bernett, 495
F.2d 943, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Trustworthiness is not a constitutional question at all; it is
the classical question for the jury, under adequate instructions of course, unless the evidence
is so blatantly unreliable that it should be excluded on the grounds of competence or prejudice.");
Westen, supra note 21, at 1190, 1199. The check always remains that, in the aggregate, evidence
must support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt to comport with due process. See supra
note 108.
117. There is some ambiguity in the Roberts opinion as to the proper scope of the reliability
inquiry. Initially, Justice Blackmun argued that if evidence does not fall within a "firmly rooted
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purposes, traditional hearsay rules guide the assessment of reliability. 118
The investigation is circumscribed, comporting with the practical need
for precise and workable rules of evidence in criminal trials. 119 In
Roberts, for example, the Court explicitly declined to consider the
parties' relationships or the inherent plausibility of the particular
testimony at issue; it looked instead to the "accouterments [sic] of the
preliminary hearing itself." 120 This categoric approach provides trial
judges with a rule of thumb. Due process, on the other hand, requires
a full exploration of surrounding circumstances 121 when a defendant
is found to have waived the right to confront a grand jury witness. 122
It is of course impossible to com.pile an exhaustive list of factors a
court should consider under the due process approach. In every case,
however, the witness, the nature. of the testimony, corroboration, and
subsequent events are significant areas of concern.
hearsay exception," it "must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (footnote omitted). His opinion proceeds to discuss
the reliability of the preliminary hearing testimony at issue, comparing it with California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149 (1970), and focusing on the existence of vigorous defense questioning. This analysis
seems to be an acknowledgment that this case, involving uncross-examined preliminary hearing
testimony, is not governed by a "firmly rooted hearsay exception." See supra note 58. Later
in the opinion, however, Justice Blackmun wrote: "[W]e reject [Roberts's] attempt to fall back
on generalized principles of confrontation, and his argument that this case falls among those
in which the Court must undertake a particularized search for 'indicia of reliability'." Rather,
the proper approach was to focus on the "guarantees of trustworthiness in ~he accouterments
[sic] of the preliminary hearing itself," not on the "inherent reliability or unreliability" of the
unavailable witness and her story. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 72-73. Applying the Court's analysis
to the admissibility of grand jury testimony, the correct method for assessing compliance with
confrontation seems to be an examination of its "accoutrements," i.e., a categoric approach.
Lower courts, however, have focused on Roberts' "particularized guarantees" language and,
after considering a broad range of factors, have often found grand jury testimony sufficiently
reliable to meet the confrontation test in a particular case. See, e.g., United States v. Barlow,
693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982); United States v.
Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). The problem with this interpretation of the
Roberts test is that it renders the second step-reliability analysis-virtually indistinguishable
from due process scrutiny. See supra note 110. A number of authors have, in fact, argued that
confrontation encompasses only the first prong of the Roberts test-necessity-and that reliability
is properly understood as a due process concern. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
172-89 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Westen, supra note 21; Note, supra note 40. Although
this approach is conceptually sound, it has been specifically rejected by the Supreme Court. Roberts,
448 U.S. at 66-68 n.9.
118. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
119. Id. at 64.
120. Id. at 73. See also supra note 117.
121. See supra note 110.
122. This examination need not unduly burden the administration of justice. A due process
hearing can often be combined with a hearing to determine whether confrontation has been waived.
See supra note 102. See also Baker, supra note 70, at 549-55 (advocating a short due process
hearing, with the burden of proof on the defendant if the hearsay falls within an exception).
But see Natali, Green, Dutton and Chambers: Three Cases in Searr:h of a Theory, 7 RUT.-CAM.
L. REV. 43, 58-59 (1975) (arguing that due process hearings are an unworkable solution).

FALL

1982)

Grand Jury Testimony at Trial

A.

173

The Witness

The trier of fact must evaluate a declarant's credibility whether or
not he ever appears as a witness at trial. 123 When the witness is
unavailable, there are simply fewer tools for performing the job. 124
Indirect indicators of credibility can satisfy the requirements of due
process, however. Many judgments about the various elements of witness
credibility - sincerity, perception, memory, and ability to communicate125 - can be formulated on the basis of information available to
a judge at a due process hearing on admissibility. 126 If circumstances
suggest that the grand jury testimony is false or that the trier of fact
will have no effective means of assessing the witness's credibility, it
should be excluded. If an examination reveals that the testimony is
merely questionable, it should be admitted for consideration by the
trier of fact along with the rest of the evidence, and weighted
appropriately. 121
The relationship of the unavailable witness to the defendant and to
the alleged crime is a key element under a due process ''totality of
the circumstances" approach because it can influence the assessment
of the witness's credibility. For example, a grand jury witness without
personal ties to the defendant and who is not under investigation for
a crime is more likely to testify accurately than a witness who is implicated in the crime or connected with the defendant. 128 In United
States v. Mastrangelo, 129 the grand jury testimony of an unavailable
witness was needed to identify the defendant as the purchaser of four

123. See Westen, supra note 65, at 598-99 (no absolute correlation exists between direct or
indirect testimony and reliability; both should be evaluated under a single test). Considerations
include consistency with other information in the case, internal consistency, and conformance
with the trier of fact's pre-existing knowledge. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA
L. REV. 331 (1960).
124. A witness's unavailability removes the opportunities for observation and cross-examination.
Weinstein, supra note 123, at 333. But see United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982)
(although the witness invoked the marital privilege and so was "unavailable," her live testimony
in a companion case gave the trial judge an opportunity to observe her; two juries had been
empaneled to hear most of the evidence in both cases simultaneously).
125. Davenport, supra note 114; Weinstein, supra note 123, at 331; The Supreme Court,
supra note 40, at 188-89.
126. See supra note 122. Examples of evidence bearing on credibility for which the declarant
need not be present include information concerning reputation, inconsistent statements, prior
acts, and motive to falsify.
127. See supra-notes 115 & 116. Weinstein, supra note 123, at 336, 350 (courts should highlight
hearsay for the untrained jury; where excludable hearsay is admitted without objection at trial,
it should be given whatever weight it. is entitled to under the circumstances). See also Westen,
supra note 65, at 598-99 (juries are well-equipped to evaluate hearsay because its limitations
are self-evident).
128. See United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982).
129. 533 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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trucks in which drugs had been found. The court noted, in deciding
to admit the testimony, that the unavailable man was not under investigation as a participant in the crime and had not been granted
immunity. 130 Thus, the witness "had no motive to testify falsely." 131
Victims, in comparison, constitute a somewhat less reliable category
of witnesses 132 because they were involved in the crime and are interested
in the trial outcome. The possible desire for revenge makes a victim
less trustworthy than the Mastrangelo "third party" witness. 133 Nevertheless, victims may simply testify truthfully and rely on the criminal
justice system to punish wrongdoers. 134 As a general rule, a victim's
testimony is not so inherently unreliable that it violates due process.
In Stovall v. Denno, 135 for example, the Supreme Court upheld the
admissibility of a suspect identification which was conducted at a
hospital because the victim was too severely injured to make the trip
to jail. 136
Accomplices, co-defendants, and paid informants constitute the least
reliable category of witnesses. 137 Although it is difficult to assess the
degree to which their personal interests - both financial and penal
- will influence testimony before the grand jury, 138 the accuracy and
completeness of their testimony is suspect. Such witnesses are likely
to shift blame or try to curry the prosecutor's favor. If immunity is
granted, the total or qualified insulation from future criminal sane-

130. Id. at 391. The witness had been murdered only hours before he was due to testify.
The judge declared a mistrial and a second trial was scheduled for ten months later. The pretrial
ruling on the admissibility of the grand jury testimony was based on a Roberts confrontation
analysis, not due process grounds; the court specifically rejected the argument that a finding
of confrontation waiver was necessary. Id. at 390 n.5.
131. Id. at 391.
132. See, e.g., Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1981); Morrow v. Wyrick, 646 F.2d
1229 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 899 (1981); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339
(5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Blakey, 607. F.2d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 1979).
133. See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
135. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
136. The special status of victims is also recognized when assessing probable cause for search
and seizure under the fourth amendment. Information received from victims is considered more
trustworthy than that received from ordinary informants. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note I,
at 289. The analogy is imperfect, however, because while a victim may be highly motivated to
be truthful in order to help police apprehend a wrongdoer, there is less disincentive to lie to
ensure conviction once the accused is in custody.
137. Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 138 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[C]ertain kinds of hearsay ... are at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult to discount,
that jurors cannot be trusted to give- such evidence the minimal -weight it logically deserves, whatever
instructions the trial judge might give." (citations omitted). This case involved a co-defendant's
confession).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982); Black v. Woods,
651 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977).
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tions may encourage embellishment by the witness. 139 Moreover, close
connections to the defendant's allegedly criminal activities may compromise reliability by making the witness more fearful of retaliation
by the defendant or his associates. When these sorts of witnesses are
involved, the court's due process review must be especially scrupulous,
for it is the testimony of accomplices and informants which is likely
to be most incriminating and to play a vital role in meeting the government's burden of proof. 140
The problems associated with the grand jury testimony of coconspirators were explored in United States v. Gonzalez, 141 where a
convicted drug smuggler refused to testify at the trial of the man who
allegedly hired him. The court characterized the witness's dilemma as
"either testifying and exposing his family and himself to retaliatory
injury by other criminals, or not testifying and incurring prolonged
confinement ... for contempt." "[T]he important thing to him," the
court concluded, "was that he gave an answer, be it truth or not." 142
Even under the comparatively lenient due process standard, 143 the high
probability that such grand jury testimony will be unreliable makes
it a likely candidate for exclusion at trial. 144

B.

The Testimony

The substance of the grand jury testimony, and the manner in which
it is elicited, can be a useful indication of its reliability. If the transcript
reveals few leading questions, for example, a judge may reasonably
conclude that the witness had sufficient opportunity to express fully
and impartially all the facts within his knowledge. 145 Although contemporaneous cross-examination is the preferred method for ensuring
accuracy and completeness, a comprehensive and unbiased account may
be worthy of consideration. 146
139. United States v. Thevis, 66S F.2d 616, 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982).
See also United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982) (embellishment is unlikely when
it would harm the witness's boyfriend).
140. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
141. S59 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977).
142. Id. at 1272-73. But cf. United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 936 (1978) (co-conspirator's grand jury testimony admissible.)
143. See supra notes 11S-16 and accompanying text.
144. This, of course, assumes that countervailing factors - such as the degree of detail and
corroboration - fail to compensate for the questionable source. See infra notes 145-169 and
accompanying text.
14S. See supra note 85.
146. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, l~I (1970) (contemporaneous cross-examination
is not required if "the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the
prior statement."). Cf. supra note 9 (cases finding grand jury testimony adequately reliable for
admission, relying on theories other than due process).
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A statement's reliability is also enhanced if it is detailed 147 and reflects
first-hand experiences of the witness. 148 In Spinelli v. United States, 149
the Court focused on the degree of detail present in hearsay offered
to establish probable cause for a search warrant. It noted that "when
confronted with such detail, [a magistrate] could reasonably infer that
the informant had gained his information in a reliable way." " 0
Moreover, in a series of suspect identification cases, is, the Court has
considered the level of certainty demonstrated by a witness and the
length of time that elapsed between the events in question and the
witness's identification. These factors may also provide insight into
the perception, memory, and sincerity of unavailable grand jury
witnesses. 1 s2

C.

Corroboration and Subsequent Events

Examining the ''totality of circumstances'' requires looking beyond
the witness's identity and the characteristics of the testimony itself to
events subsequent to the grand jury proceedings, including those occurring during the trial, and to the overall scheme of proof. 1 s 3
147. Compare United States v. West, S74 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978), United States v. Garner,
S74 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978), and United States v. Mastrangelo,
S33 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (detail enhances reliability), with United States v. Gonzalez,
S59 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977) Oack of detail suggests testimony is not trustworthy). Cf. Spinelli
v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (informant's detailed account implies reliability) (dictum).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982). While detailed
testimony from personal knowledge suggests that the witness's perception and memory are trustworthy, it is not a guarantee of sincerity. Cf. FED. R. Evm. 602 ("personal knowledge" requirement); McCORMICK. supra note 23, § 10 (observation requirement is "[o]ne of the earliest
and most pervasive manifestations" of the common law's "insistence upon the most reliable
sources of information."). See also supra notes 83-84 (double hearsay is less reliable).
149. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
ISO. Id. at 417 (discussing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (19S9)).
151. Mason v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
152. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (detailed discussion of eleme_nts contributing
to reliability of "show-up" suspect identification; no due process violation).
153. The Supreme Court has suggested that different standards would apply when assessing
confrontation clause challenges, depending on whether or not evidence is "crucial" or
"devastating." Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87 (1970) (plurality opinion). Although the Court
never elaborated on this point and has not used the distinction in its later confrontation analysis,
the "crucial/devastating" language (or a paraphrase) often appears in lower court opinions. See,
e.g., United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 662 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that the function of the
characterization is "unclear"); Morrow v. Wyrick, 646 F.2d 1229, 1231, 1234 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 4S4 U.S. 899 (1981); United States v. Marks, 58S F.2d 164, 168-69 (6th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Roberts, S83 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1080
(197.9); United States v. Rogers, S49 F.2d 490, S00-01 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
918 (1977); United States v. Yates, S24 F.2d 1282, 1286 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 197S); United States
v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 95S, 969-70 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Park v. Huff, 493 F.2d 923, 92S (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (197S); United States v. Adams, 446 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971).
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Events occurring after grand jury proceedings may influence an assessment of the trustworthiness of testimony. In some cases, witnesses have

reaffirmed 154 or recanted 155 their previous testimony; in others they have
disappeared, 156 died, 157 or refused to be sworn at trial. 158 Although
definitive conclusions about the accuracy of the testimony or the
credibility of the witness cannot be drawn from such developments, 159
failure to testify under suspicious circumstances inevitably suggests that
credible and ~amaging testimony would have been elicited at trial. 160
The plausibility of an explanation for a witness's change of heart or
absence - or the lack of an explanation - may reflect on the trustworthiness of his earlier testimony before the grand jury. Such developments are therefore a factor relevant to due process analysis.
More importantly, the significance of a grand jury transcript will
vary from trial to trial. It may be offered to prove a key element of
the offense, or only to establish some subsidiary fact. 161 There may
The meanings of "crucial" and "devastating" are unclear. Evidence might be "crucial" in
that it relates directly to an essential element of the offense, rather than merely to some relevant
but peripheral point. Or, evidence relating to any fact might be "crucial" because it is the sole
way to prove that fact. Given this second interpretation, it is anomolous to require more corroboration to establish the reliability of "crucial" evidence, because the very existence of corroboration renders the disputed evidence less "crucial." "Devastating" may be synonomous with
"crucial" in this context, although it suggests a concern with prejudice as well as with sufficiency.
In light of the Roberts approach to confrontation, the "crucial/devastating" characterization
seems irrelevant: evidence that meets the threshold of the reliability test ought to be admitted,
whether "crucial" or cumulative. See supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text. In contrast,
the significance of a particular piece of evidence is important for due process purposes. Due
process imposes a requirement that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970). Therefore, if evidence of questionable reliability plays a minimal role in
the overall scheme of proof and is corroborated, the due process standard may be satisfied,
while if it is crucial or devastating, it may offend due process. This interpretation of the
crucial/devastating characterization also solves a practical problem. When a party seeks to introduce a particular item of evidence, the judge may find it difficult to evaluate its significance
immediately. Once the prosecution has presented its entire case, however, the relative value of
the evidence will become apparent. See generally The Supreme Court, supra note 40, at 196-99.
Cf. United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982) (comprehensive discussion of relevant
considerations, applying Roberts confrontation analysis).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 840 (1980); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1353 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 914 (1976).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Garner,
574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978).
156. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Cf. Lenza v. Wyrick, 66S F.2d 804
(8th Cir. 1981) (extrajudicial statements of missing witness admitted).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
57 (1982); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978).
158. See, e.g., United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 840 (1980); United States v. Gonzalez, S59 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.· denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973).
159. The problem of completeness remains as well. See supra note 73.
160. See supra note 102.
161. Compare United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977) (grand jury testimony
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be corroborating evidence, or the grand jury testimony may be the
sole item of support for a particular point. 162 When corroborating
evidence establishes the accuracy of factual assertions contained in the
testimony, its reliability is enhanced. In United States v. Garner, 163
for example, an unavailable 164 co-conspirator's grand jury testimony
concerning joint travel was corroborated by a traveling companion's
live testimony as well as by airline tickets, customs declarations, passport
endorsements, and hotel registrations. 165 In many cases, however, the
corroboration will be only partial, and it will not ensure that the uncorroborated parts of the testimony are equally accurate or that the
testimony is complete and unbiased. Nevertheless, corroborating
evidence militates in favor of admitting grand jury testimony. 166 It indicates that at least some aspects of the testimony are accurate and it
provides the defendant with alternative opportunities to attack the
government's case 167 when one of the usual mechanisms - crossexamination - is limited. 168 The ability to defend is an essential component of due process fairness. 169
CONCLUSION

The admission of the grand jury testimony of a witness who is unavailable at trial implicates competing values that are fundamental to the
criminal justice system. On the one hand, society has a strong interest
in pursuing criminal prosecutions and assuring that the best evidence
"crucial" to link the defendant to the crime), with United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th
Cir. 1982) (grand jury testimony used to rebut defendant's alibi).
162. Compare United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978) (grand jury testimony
corroborated by photographs, taped conversations, and live testimony), with United States v.
Balano, 618 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979) (defendant only "marginally" linked with crimes without
grand jury testimony), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980).
163. 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978). Again, analysis was based
on confrontation and not due process grounds.
164. The witness in this case did take the stand and answered some questions posed by defense
counsel, though he refused to respond to others posed by both the defense and the prosecution.
Id. at 1143.
165. Id. at 1144-45.
166. See, e.g., United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 57 (1982); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978); United States v. Ward,
552 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 850 (1977). But cf. Davenport, supra note 114,
at 1390 (objecting to bootstrapping).
167. See, e.g., United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1135 (4th Cir. 1978) (although the
grand jury witness had died, the government agents who had supervised his undercover work
appeared and were subject to cross-examination; defense counsel also presented evidence of his
past criminal record to impeach the missing witness).
168. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 106.
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will be available for the prosecution to use at trial. On the other hand,
the Constitution assures defendants of a fair opportunity to defend
themselves within the adversary model. This represents both a symbolic commitment to basic notions of justice and a practical concern
for accurate and efficient criminal adjudication. Applying the confrontation test of the Roberts Court, however, the grand jury testimony
of an unavailable witness must be excluded at trial. Even if a defendant
waives the right to confront, due process requires that evidence lacking minimal guarantees of reliability not be admitted.
There is little reason to fear that this understanding of Roberts will
result in many lost convictions, for alternatives to the use of grand
jury transcripts exist: the prosecutor can memorialize critical testimony
by holding preliminary hearings 110 or by taking depositions. 171 Ultimately, convictions must be based on proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt; given the requirements of confrontation and due process, the
grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness has a limited role to
play in tipping the balance.

-Barbara L. Strack

170. In Roberts, for example, Ohio conducted the preliminary hearing in addition to a grand
jury proceeding. See supra note 31. See also supra note 2 (states tending to switch from indictment to information). See generally CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 20-21 (jurisdictional
variations in the use of preliminary hearings, grand juries, and double review).
171. The right to take depositions in criminal cases is usually more limited than in civil litigation. Compare, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a) with FED. R. C1v; P. 26(a). See generally CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 1168-70.

